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Introduction 
The rule of law is an important concept in modern democracies. It is a 
philosophy that embraces the idea that if we are all held accountable to the same 
fundamental rules; society will develop in a fair manner. Despotism will be 
avoided. The corruptive influence of power will be mitigated. As expressed by 
Lord Bingham in presentation at the Sixth Sir David Williams lecture: 
“The core of the existing principle is, I suggest, that all persons and 
authorities within the states, whether public or private, should be bound by 
and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated 
and publicly administered in the courts.”1  
 
It is particularly important, in the context of what will be discussed in this 
paper, that when the legislature grants powers, that these are properly exercised. 
The rule of law will define how and by whom powers may be exercised and this is 
the means by which the legislature will direct and manage the activity of the 
executive. Lord Bingham stated further on in his presentation that one of the sub-
rules of the rule of law was that: 
“… that ministers and public officers at all levels must exercise the powers 
conferred on them reasonably, in good faith, for the purpose for which the 
powers were conferred and without exceeding the limits of such 
powers.”(emphasis mine)2 
 
  
                                                        
1 Rt Hounourable Lord Bingham, “The Rule of Law” (Sir David Williams lecture, London, November 
2006) 
http://www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/sites/www.law.cam.ac.uk/files/images/www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/legacy/Medi
a/THE%20RULE%20OF%20LAW%202006.pdf accessed 22 August 2016 
2 Rt Hounourable Lord Bingham, “The Rule of Law” (Sir David Williams lecture, London, November 
2006) 
http://www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/sites/www.law.cam.ac.uk/files/images/www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/legacy/Medi
a/THE%20RULE%20OF%20LAW%202006.pdf accessed 22 August 2016 
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However, in order for the rule of law to be effective, and for the extent of 
the powers exercised to be known, the law must be clear. As stated by Lord 
Diplock: 
“Absence of clarity is destructive of the rule of law”3 
 How can a rule be applied equally to all if its meaning is not clear? 
How can individuals be expected to comply with the law if they do not truly 
understand what it means? In this context, the importance of clarity is evident. To 
ensure clarity we rely on Parliament to provide clear instructions as to the intent 
of any law they wish to pass which is then expressed by drafters.  However, 
despite the best efforts of drafters and legislators, statutes and regulations are 
sometimes ambiguous or leave gaps. In order to ensure that, even in those 
circumstances, there is a means of making sense of the law; the courts need to 
develop clear principles of interpretation. If standardized, they will assist the 
reader in understanding the law and provide predictability in the outcome of the 
interpretive process.  
Additionally, the drafters have to interpret the instructions of their client 
and draft the law knowing that, if there is any uncertainty, a determination of the 
meaning of the law will be resolved through the application of relevant legislation, 
such as an interpretation act, and the principles of interpretation as recognized 
and applied by the court. Having a clear understanding of what principles will be 
applied will assist the drafter in ensuring the intent of Parliament is reflected in 
the wording of the document. The greater the certainty as to what rules of 
                                                        
3 Merkur Island Shipping v Corp Laughton [1983] 2 WLR 778 
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interpretation will apply, the easier it is for the drafter to select the appropriate 
terms and forms of expression required to achieve the intent of Parliament.  
In the Canadian context, the courts have adopted a number of interpretive 
techniques throughout the years.4 For some time, however, the Supreme Court 
of Canada has held that uncertainty in legislation should be addressed through 
the application of the ‘modern principle’ of statutory interpretation expressed by 
Driedger and adopted by the SCC in the Rizzo case. 
This appears to have created a normative approach to interpretation that 
should be welcomed by practitioners, judges and the public. It should be 
sufficient to address all concerns relating to legislative certainty.  
This said, where the principal issue in question is whether an authority can 
be delegated or devolved, courts consistently refer to two legal principles, either 
in conjunction with standard interpretation techniques or independently.5 The two 
principles referred to by the court are: delegatus non potest delegare, a legal 
maxim which proposes that someone to whom a power has been delegated 
cannot further delegate; and the Carltona Principle which flows from a UK case in 
1943 and generally stands for the idea that Ministers are not expected to 
personally exercise every power granted to them in legislation. Carltona 
recognizes that the Minister is expected to ensure that the Ministry’s work is 
accomplished and is accountable to Parliament for that work. In this context, the 
powers of the Minister can be exercised on their behalf by employees of the 
ministry in question.  
                                                        
4 Ruth Sullivan, “Statutory Interpretation in a New Nutshell”  (2003) 82 Can Bar Rev 51 
http://www.cba.org/cba_barreview/Search.aspx?VolDate=05%2f01%2f2003 accessed 5 January 2015 
5 R v NDT Ventures Ltd., 2001 NLCA 16 
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It’s my contention that delegatus non potest delegare and the Cartlona 
Principle are unnecessary constructs that do nothing to assist in the 
interpretation of statutes that cannot be addressed simply through the proper 
application of the ‘modern principle’ of interpretation adopted by the SCC in 
Rizzo. Adhering to these concepts, rather than simply approaching any issue of 
clarity through the application of the ‘modern principle’, clouds understanding and 
complicates the task of ensuring drafters, lawyers, judges and the public at large 
understand how a law will be applied and how and by whom powers should be 
exercised. 
In this paper I will explore what Dreidger meant by the ‘modern principle’ 
and how the traditional canons and presumptions of interpretation fit in the 
‘modern principle’. I will demonstrate that delegatus non potest delegare and the 
Carltona principle provide no additional insight and how the situations they 
purport to address can be equally explained through the ‘modern principle’. 
Finally, in order to better understand how the application of the ‘modern principle’ 
allows us to fully explain issues of delegation, I will provide a case study 
exploring delegation and devolution in the context of an acting commanding 
officer in the Canadian Armed Forces. 
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The Modern Principle 
The “rules” of interpretation 
Prior to the adoption by the SCC of the ‘modern principle’, the rules of 
interpretation of legislation were not consistent. 6 The eminent scholar, and 
drafter of the seminal paper on delegatus, John Willis identified three primary 
rules that continue, slightly modified, today:  
1. The mischief rule, now referred to as the purposive analysis, relies 
on the identification of the harm that the legislation is meant to address 
and requires an interpretation of the ambiguity in that context. The 
interpreters must ask themselves what the legislature intended. In 
conducting this analysis, previous versions of the act, historical data 
relating to the initial enactment, relevant extrinsic material and the 
preamble and purpose clauses can be used to establish the intent. 
Additionally, a consideration of how the act is meant to operate, the 
scheme of the act, can be of assistance;  
2. The plain meaning or literal rule, now referred to as the textual 
analysis, generally requires the consideration of the words in their normal 
everyday meaning to determine the intent of Parliament, particularly if the 
audience is the general public. Additionally, the modern variant allows for 
                                                        
6 Some would say that even after the adoption of this principle, the courts continued to apply only the 
interpretive tools that would lead to the outcome they had already fixed. However, for the basis of this 
paper we will take the court’s expression at face value and will presume that the ‘modern principle’ is 
always applied.  John Willis, “Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell” (1938) 16 Can Bar Rev 1 
http://www.cba.org/cba_barreview/Search.aspx?VolDate=05%2f01%2f2003 accessed 5 January 2015 and 
Ruth Sullivan, “Statutory Interpretation in a New Nutshell”  (2003) 82 Can Bar Rev 51 
http://www.cba.org/cba_barreview/Search.aspx?VolDate=05%2f01%2f2003 accessed 5 January 2015 
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the presumption of the “technical meaning” of a term if the audience is 
specialized; and  
3. The golden rule, or consequential analysis, which is based on an 
assumption that lawmakers did not intend an unreasonable or absurd 
outcome. If a proposed interpretation would lead to an absurd outcome, 
then it is not to be followed. In considering this, it is appropriate to also 
consider the intended social policy outcome.7  
At the time Willis first discussed these rules (as they were then expressed); he 
suggested that the courts would not rely on the application or consideration of all 
of the rules but may rely on one alone and that lawyers should be prepared for 
this.8 The court in Rizzo, however, determined that only applying one rule, 
without the consideration of the effect of the others, would not be appropriate. 
They therefore adopted the ‘modern principle’ that requires the interpreter to 
consider all of the rules of interpretation before arriving at a conclusion as to the 
meaning of the legislation. Dreidger expressed it as follows: 
“Today there is only one principle or approach, namely the words of an act 
are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary 
sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act and 
the intention of Parliament”9 
 
                                                        
7 John Willis, “Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell” (1938) 16 Can Bar Rev 1 
http://www.cba.org/cba_barreview/Search.aspx?VolDate=05%2f01%2f2003 accessed 5 January 2015; 
Geoff R. Hall, “Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada: the Triumph of a Common Law 
Methodology” (1998) 21 Adv Q 28  http://www.mccarthy.ca/pubs/Statutory_Interpretation_Triumph.pdf  
accessed 14 December 2015; Ruth Sullivan, “Statutory Interpretation in a New Nutshell”  (2003) 82 Can 
Bar Rev 51 http://www.cba.org/cba_barreview/Search.aspx?VolDate=05%2f01%2f2003 accessed 5 
January 2015  
8 John Willis, “Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell” (1938) 16 Can Bar Rev 1 
http://www.cba.org/cba_barreview/Search.aspx?VolDate=05%2f01%2f2003 accessed 5 January 2015 
9  Rizzo v Rizzo Shoes Ltd, [1998] 1 SCR 27  
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While it may appear that these rules or modes of analysis might have displaced 
the older canons or assumptions in interpretation, this is not so. The new steps in 
analysis actually incorporate the existing canons and assumptions. There was no 
intent to exclude any existing tool in interpretation, just a need to recognize that 
all relevant tools should be applied and weighed before a conclusion can be 
reached.  The canons and assumptions that have historically been used by 
courts in understanding legislation are still relevant factors to be considered. 
Driedger was merely expressing the need to consider all relevant material before 
deciding on the meaning of the law. It would be more accurate to suggest that 
the intent was to incorporate all the relevant rules and weigh them as appropriate 
in a given circumstance.10 Reviewing the canons and assumptions, they can fit 
fairly well into the proposed three rule or analytical approaches. Some may fit 
into more than one category and perhaps should be kept in mind in both steps.  
The Assumptions  
 The assumptions are really a means of “reading the mind” of the drafter 
and presuming a certain level of professionalism on their behalf. The four 
principle presumptions are:  
1. Straightforward expression The presumption is that Parliament 
(through the drafter) used the simplest and clearest means of expressing 
its intent. The most obvious meaning should be adopted; otherwise an 
                                                        
10 Stéphane Beaulac and Pierre-André Côté, “Driedger’s ‘modern principle’ at the Supreme Court of 
Canada: Interpretation, Justification, Legitimization” (2006) Revue Juridique Thémis, forthcoming 
https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1866/1352/BeaulacCôtéRJT40-1.pdf accessed 6 
January 2015 
 
 8 
 
alternative phrase or terms would have been adopted. This can easily be 
incorporated into the textual analysis. 
2. Uniform expression Parliament uses the same words and phrases to 
mean the same things within and between legislation. If an unusual 
meaning is intended, it will be clearly expressed. This can be incorporated 
into the textual analysis. 
3. No tautology This can be summarized by saying that there are no 
extra words or phrases in a text. If the term or phrase is there, it’s because 
it serves a purpose. This could be applied in both the textual and the 
purposive analysis. 
4. Internal coherence The various parts of a piece of legislation work 
together with a common purpose and are consistent. This can be 
incorporated in the purposive analysis.11 
The Canons 
 The canons of interpretation are long established tools to assist in 
understanding the intent of the legislature. The following are the principle matters 
that must be considered when understanding a given text. 
1.  Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the implied exclusion rule) 
This rule dictates that if the legislation expressly includes a term it implies 
that other terms were intentionally excluded. If the legislation specifically 
grants a certain power to a named individual, the presumption is that this 
power is not granted to anyone else. By taking the time to name one 
                                                        
11 Ruth Sullivan, “Statutory Interpretation in a New Nutshell”  (2003) 82 Can Bar Rev 51 
http://www.cba.org/cba_barreview/Search.aspx?VolDate=05%2f01%2f2003 accessed 5 January 2015 
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individual, by inference, the legislation means to exclude others. The 
obverse is also true; if a named person or item is excluded, the 
presumption is that no others are intended to be excluded. For example if 
a law prohibits the seizure of a farmer’s horse, it is presumed that the 
butcher’s horse can be seized.12 This rule can be incorporated into the 
textual analysis. 
2. Noscitur a sciis (the associated words rule) This rule requires the 
consideration of the words with which a term is associated in order to 
understand the meaning of that term. For example, the word “horn” might 
be ambiguous. If it is associated with bugle, clarinet and saxophone, it 
becomes clear that it is intended to be the musical instrument. If it is 
associated with terms such as hoof, mane, or tail, then the implication is 
that it is meant to be the body part of an animal.13 This can best be 
incorporated into the textual analysis. 
3. Ejusdem generis (the limited class rule) This is really just a slightly 
different application of the Noscitur rule in that the words that are 
associated will modify how a term is understood. In this case, if a general 
term follows a specific term (usually there will have to be a list of specific 
terms to engage this rule), the general term is to be interpreted narrowly in 
                                                        
12 Paul- André Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (2nd  edn, Carswell 2011)  358; Ruth 
Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (6th edn, LexisNexis 2014) 
13 Paul- André Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (2nd  edn, Carswell 2011)  358; Ruth 
Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (6th edn, LexisNexis 2014) 
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the context of the specific terms.1415 It would be best to apply this rule 
during the textual analysis. 
4. In pari materia (common intent rule) Because the legislature is 
presumed to be producing consistent legislation on common subject 
matters, other acts applying to the same type of issue should guide the 
interpretation. Legislation on common matters should explain each other.16 
This is best used in the textual analysis. 
5. Reddendo singular singulis This rule applies to how a modifying 
phrase, at the end of a list of words, functions. It is said to modify only the 
last term in the list.17  This rule should be applied during the textual 
analysis.  
 Applying these canons and the relevant assumptions to the purposive, 
textual and consequential analyses should allow for the resolution of any 
ambiguity in law. If that is the case, why do we see the courts applying additional 
criteria when considering delegation in the context of a statute? Are they really 
necessary or are they simply an alternate means of encapsulating the process 
that is arrived at through the application of the ‘modern principle’?  
  
                                                        
14 In Consolidated Fastfrate, the court considered how to interpret “other works and undertakings” in the 
context of the Constitution. Because the words of the act were “lines of steam or other ships, railways, 
canals, telegraphs and other works and undertakings” the court limited the meaning of “other works an 
undertakings” to transportation activities. Consolidated Fastfrate Inc v Western Canada Council of 
Teamsters, [2009] SCC 53 
15 Paul- André Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (2nd  edn, Carswell 2011)  358; Ruth 
Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (6th edn, LexisNexis 2014) 
16 Sharbern holdings Inc v Vancouver Airport Centre Ltd, [2011] 2 SCR 175 at para 117 the court quoted 
R. v Loxdale 97 ER 394 
17 Rogers v. Aliant CRTC 2007-75, http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2007/dt2007-75.htm accessed 15 
December 2014 
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Delegation and devolution 
 In order to compare the delegation rules to the ‘modern principle’ we need 
to answer the following questions: 1. What is delegation or devolution? 2. Why is 
it necessary? and 3. What do we use to control delegation and devolution? 
What is delegation? 
A look at the dictionary definitions of delegation and devolution provides 
no helpful guidance.18 However, the traditional understanding of delegation is the 
granting of a power that is to de exercised by the grantee. Devolution is generally 
expressed as an agency relationship. When De Smith, Woolf and Jowell discuss 
the concepts of devolution (agency) and delegation, they provide the following 
distinctions between the two: 
Agent:1. The agent acts on behalf of principal and in their name. Acts by 
agents are attributable to principal. 2. The agent is given detailed 
instructions by principal and usually doesn’t have a wide are of discretion. 3. 
The principal retains concurrent powers. 
Delegate: 1. The delegate acts in own name 2. The delegate has scope of 
authority and discretion. 3. The principal retains powers to revoke but is 
bound by decision made by delegate.19 
We can understand by this that the idea behind both delegation and devolution is 
a scheme that allows someone other than the grantee identified in the statute to 
                                                        
18 The Concise Oxford Dictionary 2nd edition 2004 defines delegation as the action or process of delegating 
or being delegated. It further defines the verb delegate as entrusting a task or responsibility to another or 
authorizing someone to act as a representative on one’s behalf. It defines devolution as the devolving of 
power by a central government to a local or regional administration. It then defines devolve as the transfer 
or delegation of power to a lower level, especially from central government to local or regional 
administration. It’s hard to make out a clear distinction between the two using these definitions. 
19 de Smith, Woolf and Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action  (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1995) 
361 
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exercise a specific authority (legislative, judicial or administrative). The distinction 
between the two is primarily based on how much control the principle authority 
holder retains in the process. Reasonably, we can expect that the greater the 
control retained, the more likely the court is to recognize and authority to allow 
another to act on the principal’s behalf. Undoubtedly the risk of allowing another 
to act is mitigated by the level of control exerted. In the analysis of the courts, we 
can see that risk mitigation appears to be the guiding principle, not whether it is a 
“true” delegation or an agency relationship.  
Regardless of how the courts reach their findings, the decision is 
fundamentally about whether an individual has the formal authority to act, an 
implied authority to act, or no authority to act? 
Why do we need delegation or devolution? 
In order to understand why delegation and devolution is necessary, one 
needs to understand how the government is run. Through the Constitution, the 
Canadian government is divided into three branches: the executive, legislative 
and judicial. The three branches of government are meant to work together but 
exercise jurisdiction over specific matters. The executive is made up of the Prime 
Minister and his ministers who form the Cabinet. They hold the authority to run 
the country on a day to day basis and exercise the powers of the Crown. The 
Ministers are part of the executive as a result of forming the Cabinet, but they are 
also part of the legislative branch, as most are members of parliament.  Though a 
minister can also be selected from among the senators, this is rare. The 
legislature, principally the House of Commons and the Senate, pass the laws that 
 13 
 
direct the country and its citizens.  The Judiciary, made up of the various courts, 
apply and interpret the law.20  
While, as a general rule, each branch is expected to exercise discretion 
over matters within their jurisdiction, in practice it is a more complex relationship. 
It is more accurate to suggest that the executive exercises discretion over certain 
subject matters under their control and are accountable to Parliament for the 
exercise of that discretion. While the legislative branch will pass laws, they will 
often delegate the authority to create regulations to the executive (the minister 
and his staff). 
In fact, through legislation, ministers (and the civil servants working for 
them in their departments) are routinely delegated the authority to create 
regulations and exercise discretion in decision making processes. As Jones and 
de Villars have stated: 
“Thus, members of the departmentalized civil service form part of the 
executive branch of government but may be delegated powers that are not 
really executive in nature, powers such as (a) to make subordinate 
legislation; (b) to determine disputes in a judicial or quasi-judicial manner; 
or (c) to do some merely administrative act (such as issuing drivers’ 
licences or admitting returning Canadian citizens to the country)”21  
 
This delegation is necessary because of the breadth of activity that must be 
taken on by the executive.  
The day to day exercise of the Crown authority can only be accomplished 
through some form of delegation of powers. This is not a novel concept. The 
need to delegate had been a concern for some time. It was aptly expressed by 
                                                        
20 Craig Forcese and Aaron Freeman, The Laws of Government (Irwin Law 2005) 
21 Jones and de Villars, Principles of Administrative Law (5th edn, Carswell 2009) 89 
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our own government in their publication “Review of accountabilities and 
responsibilities of ministers”: 
“Clearly, the management and direction of a modern government 
department requires significant formal delegation. In fact, this reality is not 
unique to contemporary government. Over 150 years ago, in the famous 
Northcote-Trevelyan Report on the British civil service, the following 
statement was made: “The Government of this country could not be 
carried on without the aid of an efficient body of permanent officers, 
occupying a position duty subordinate to that of the Ministers.”22 
 
Stated another way: 
“Delegation of power by Parliament is the most important source of 
executive branch power. For example, Parliament does not directly police 
borders, levy antidumping duties, adjudicate human rights complaints, 
collect taxes or do any of the millions of other things that we associate 
with “government”. It does, however, authorize the executive to do these 
things, through acts of Parliament.”23 
 
To put it plainly, the government simply would not function without being able to 
delegate. The question then becomes how to accomplish this delegation in a 
manner that ensures the “right” person exercises the “right” authority without 
unnecessarily burdening the system with regulations and orders for minor 
matters.  
How is authority delegated? 
When authority is delegated, it can be accomplished directly through 
statute by naming an individual; by providing an individual the authority to sub 
delegate; or it can be inferred from the scheme and wording of the legislation. 
When clearly stated in the act, there is little concern, the challenge that we face 
                                                        
22 “Review of Accountabilities and Responsibilities of Ministers” https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/report/rev-
exa/ar-er-eng.pdf  accessed 12 July 2016 
23 Craig Forcese and Aaron Freeman, The Laws of Government (Irwin Law 2005) 24 
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is in determining when it is allowable to infer or imply that a delegation is 
authorized. The two principal tools used by courts in determining whether 
delegation was intended are the principle of delegatus non potest delegare and 
the Carltona principle.24 It is through the exploration of these two concepts and 
the comparison of the rationale adopted to explain them to the application of the 
‘modern principle’ that I propose to demonstrate that only the ‘modern principle’ 
need be applied in order to resolve any ambiguity in law. 
Delegatus non potest delegare 
 In 1943 John Willis wrote a paper entitled “Delegatus non potest 
delegare”.25 In it he explored when and whether a power that had been granted 
to a named individual (usually the Minister) could be exercised by someone else. 
The principle he expressed was that if an individual receives a power directly 
from the legislature, unless they are provided with a clear authority to further 
delegate that power, it must be exercised by the named individual.26  Willis 
expressed that it was a “rule” of interpretation and not a rule of law and Canadian 
courts certainly haven’t applied it with any great regularity.27 Jones and de Villars 
expressed its acceptance by Canadian courts as follows: 
“Translated to the world of statutory powers, if literally applied, it would mean 
that, absent express statutory permission, those whom parliament, the 
legislature, and indeed the makers of subordinate legislation have delegated 
power must exercise that power personally and cannot sub-delegate its 
exercise to someone else. In fact, the maxim has never been applied by the 
Canadian courts in anything resembling that absolutist position. At most, 
                                                        
24 de Smith, Woolf and Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action  (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1995); 
Jones and de Villars, Principles of Administrative Law (5th edn, Carswell 2009); Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on 
the Construction of Statutes (6th edn, LexisNexis 2014)  
25 John Willis, “Delegatus Non Potest Delegare" (1943) 21 Can Bar Rev 257 
26 Marion  L Dixon, “Delegation, Agency and the Alter Ego Rule” (1987) 11 Sydney L Rev 326 
27 John Mark Keyes, “From Delegatus to the Duty to Make Law” (1987) 33 McGill L J 49 
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Canadian courts have traded the concept that while legislative and judicial 
powers cannot be delegated, there is no outright prohibition on the 
delegation of administrative powers.”28 
 
However, when we look more closely at the manner in which Willis 
explained how delegatus functioned, we see that it is likely no more than the 
literal rule he referred to in his 1938 paper “Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell” 
and provides nothing new to the analytical process.29  Below is the description 
most often quoted from Willis’ paper on delegatus: 
“A discretion conferred by statute is prima facie intended to be exercised 
by the authority on which the statute has conferred it and by no other 
authority but this intention may be negative by any contrary 
indications found in the language, scope or object of the statute; to 
put the matter another way, the word “personally” is to be read into the 
statute after the name of the authority on which the discretion is conferred 
unless the language, scope or object of the statute shows that the words 
“or any other person authorized by it” are to be read into in its 
place.”30(emphasis mine)  
 
Applying the ‘modern principle’ to the delegatus case 
If we approach each step of delegatus as expressed by Willis and 
compare it to how it fits in the ‘modern principle’ we see that it offers nothing new 
to the analysis.  
Textual analysis 
Willis’ principle first requires us to presume that we should read in the 
word “personally” when an individual is granted an authority under the act. On 
the face of it, this is a textual analysis. It requires an assumption of 
straightforward expression where the drafter used the simplest and clearest 
                                                        
28 Jones and de Villars, Principles of Administrative Law (5th edn, Carswell 2009) 368 
29 John Willis, “Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell” (1938) 16 Can Bar Rev 1 
http://www.cba.org/cba_barreview/Search.aspx?VolDate=05%2f01%2f2003 accessed 5 January 2015 
30 John Willis, “Delegatus Non Potest Delegare" (1943) 21 Can Bar Rev 257 at 259 
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means of expressing the thought. Additionally, Expressio unius would be applied, 
as the power is granted to a named individual, it is presumed that the power is 
not granted to anyone else. At the first stage of the analysis, presuming that the 
word “personally” prefaces the named individual provides us with nothing more 
than would a textual analysis. 
Willis also suggests in his paper that the presumption against delegation 
can be displaced “by a section in the statute which expressly permits the 
authority entrusted with a discretion to delegate it to another”.31 Again, this is a 
straightforward reading of the text.  If the authority to sub delegate is expressly 
stated in the act, then that is the intent. Additionally, if such an authority is clearly 
stated in the act, using the principle of expressio unius, we could infer that where 
it isn’t stated in this manner, it is not intended to be sub delegated (note that this 
can also be displaced through further analysis). This would also be an application 
of the textual analysis. So far, there is no benefit to the application of delegatus. 
Purposive analysis 
If we now apply the purposive analysis, we will consider the “scope or 
object” of the statute when determining whether an authority to delegate is 
implied in order to effect the purpose of the Act. We need to determine if the 
intent of Parliament was to allow anyone other than the named individual to 
exercise the authority. As expressed by Jones and de Villars: 
“Firstly one can conclude that Parliament intended sub-delegation to 
occur, even in the absence of express words to that effect, where 
legislation delegates a power to a person who clearly will not be able 
to exercise it personally… Secondly, courts are prepared to accept that 
                                                        
31 John Willis, “Delegatus Non Potest Delegare" (1943) 21 Can Bar Rev 257 
 18 
 
Parliament intended to permit sub-delegation of merely administrative 
functions, as opposed to legislative or judicial ones.”32(emphasis mine) 
 
When it comes to the authority to sub-delegate, the courts, as noted 
above, have consistently recognized the reality of modern government when 
interpreting the intent of Parliament. Willis himself recognized this but described it 
as a decision to read in the term “or any other authority”. In the context of cases 
of delegation within departments, he lamented in his article on delegatus that: 
“… Courts have in most cases preferred to depart from the literal 
construction of the words of the statute which would require them to read 
in the word “personal” and to adopt such a constructions as will best 
accord with the facts of modern government which, being carried on in 
theory by elected representatives but in practice by civil servants or local 
government officers, undoubtedly require them to read in the words “or 
any person authorized by it.”33 (emphasis mine) 
 
When we apply a purposive analysis, we can look at the scheme of the 
act, the historical application and any relevant extrinsic material (such as 
Hansard discussions) to determine the intent of Parliament. The result is a 
presumption (in certain cases) that the intent of Parliament was to allow for 
delegated authority. Once again, the expression of delegatus offered us nothing 
additional.   
Consequential analysis 
As noted above, Willis recognized that in modern government, civil 
servants must be able to carry out the functions of the elected representatives 
and that, as a result, courts have read in the words “or any person authorized by 
                                                        
32 Jones and de Villars, Principles of Administrative Law (5th edn, Carswell 2009) 
33 John Willis, “Delegatus Non Potest Delegare" (1943) 21 Can Bar Rev 257 
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it”. 34 This recognition can also be interpreted as a form of consequential 
analysis. If we cannot infer that delegation is allowed, what will the consequence 
be? Clearly the legislature did not intend that the Minister would personally 
exercise all these powers as it would not be achievable. The machinery of 
government would grind to a halt. The outcome would be absurd and therefore is 
not defensible. Canadian courts agree and it has been expressed in the Ahmad 
case as follows:  
“It would be quite impossible for the deputy head of a large modern 
government department to give personal attention to all such matters, 
important as they may be to individuals concerned. That is why department 
administration is organized as it is and, in my view, there is a necessary 
implication, in the absence of something expressly or implicitly to the 
contrary, that minister’ powers, and deputy ministers; powers are exercised 
on their behalf by their departmental organizations as long as they are of an 
administrative character.”35 (emphasis mine) 
 
Once again, it’s not clear that adopting the delegatus principle provides us 
with any insight that we cannot reasonably glean through the application of the 
‘modern principle’.   By avoiding this loaded terminology, we can instead apply a 
logical step by step approach to each individual case of potential delegation of 
authority.  
The Carltona Principle 
Only a few short months after Willis published his seminal article on the 
delegatus principle, the English Court of Appeal provided a decision regarding 
the exercise of ministerial authority that remains with us today. In fact, some 
have suggested that the outcome of that case has virtually reversed the 
                                                        
34John Willis, “Delegatus Non Potest Delegare" (1943) 21 Can Bar Rev 257 at 264 
35 Ahmad v Public Service Commission, [1974] 2 FC 644 
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presumption expressed by Willis, at least with respect to powers conferred on 
Ministers. 
“Indeed, in the case of powers that are conferred on ministers of the Crown, 
the maxim has very little role to play. In this domain, the operating 
presumption is in effect reversed and, absent express provision or other 
clear indicators, ministers are assumed to be able to act through responsible 
officials in their departments and in the agencies for which they are 
responsible.”36 
 
 However, it is important to note that the Carltona case was decided based 
not on strict delegation of authority but based on the concept of devolution or 
agency.37 In essence, Carltona does not propose to displace the bar on 
delegation generally; it simply recognizes the need for civil servants to act on 
behalf of their minister.38  
The Carltona case, which took place during the second world war, 
revolved around the issuance of a notice to a factory owner that his factory was 
to be closed and used to support the war effort. The owner disputed the authority 
of the person who issued the notice, a Mr Morse, as the Act only provided for a 
“competent authority” to issue the notice in question. The regulations only 
identified the “Commissioner of Works” as a “competent authority”. The court’s 
analysis, when determining that Mr Morse could indeed issue the notice, relied 
heavily on two principles: 1. The concept that ministers are “constitutionally” 
responsible to Parliament in the Westminster model government; and 2. The 
                                                        
36 David J Mullan,  Administrative Law  (Irwin 2001) 369 
37 Mark Freedland, “The rule against delegation and the Carltona doctrine in an agency context” (1996) PL 
19 ; Ann Chaplin,  “Carltona Revisited: Accountability and the Devolution of Statutory Powers” (2008) 39 
Ottawa L Rev 495  
38 Henry Molot, “The Carltona Doctrine and the Recent Amendments to tine Interpretation Act” (1994) 26 
Ottawa L Rev 257 
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sheer impossibility of the Minister exercising personally every discretion granted 
under the law. As the court stated it: 
“In the administration of government in this country the functions which are 
given to ministers (and constitutionally properly given to ministers because 
they are constitutionally responsible) are functions so multifarious that 
no minister could ever personally attend to them. To take the example 
of the present case no doubt there have been thousands of requisitions in 
this country by individual ministries. It cannot be supposed that this 
regulation meant that, in each case, the minister in person should direct 
his mind to the matter. The duties imposed upon minister and the 
powers given to ministers are normally exercised under the authority 
of the minister by responsible official of the department. Public 
business could not be carried on if that were not the case. Constitutionally, 
the decision of such an official is, of course, the decision of the minister. 
The minister is responsible. It is he who must answer before Parliament 
for anything that his officials have done under his authority, and, if for an 
important matter be selected an officials of such junior standing that he 
could not be expected competently to perform the work, the minister would 
have to answer for that in Parliament. The whole system of departmental 
organization and administration is based on the view that minister, being 
responsible to Parliament, will see that important duties are committed to 
experienced officials. If they do not to that, Parliament is the place where 
complaint must be made against them.”39(emphasis mine) 
 
Ministerial Accountability 
 
In order to further analyse the nature of these arguments, it’s important to 
understand what the court is referring to when it discusses the constitutional 
responsibility of ministers. It has been said that the “cornerstone (of the 
Westminster model of accountable government) … is the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility” in which “Ministers are accountable to parliament for the exercise 
of authority assigned to the Crown under the constitution and under statutory 
law.”40 As expressed by Professor Hogg: “All the acts of the department are done 
in the name of the minister, and it is the minister who is responsible for 
                                                        
39 Carltona Ltd v Commissioner of Works and Others, [1943] 2 All E.R. 560(CA) at 563 
40 “Review of Accountabilities and Responsibilities of Ministers” https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/report/rev-
exa/ar-er-eng.pdf  accessed 12 July 2016 
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Parliament for those acts.”41 Fundamentally the minister is the representative of 
the executive branch of government responsible for a particular portfolio.42 
Ministers are provided with the requisite authority to manage the matters under 
their control and are expected to be accountable for accomplishing the goals set 
for them. They provide direction and guidance to the civil servants under their 
control and provide answer to Parliament for the performance of their 
department.43  
“Ministers remain individually and collectively responsible for their 
statutory duties and accountable to Parliament and the Prime Minister for 
the stewardship of the resources and exercise of powers assigned to 
them.”44 
 
Because of this, it has been suggested that the actions of civil servants 
are indistinguishable from the action of the minister. 
“…public servants have no constitutional identity independent of their 
minister.”45 
 
“… the dictum of Lord Greene as it stands, fully recognizes that, in matters 
such as those with which we are presently concerned, the Minister is not 
expected personally to take every decision entrusts to him by parliament. 
If a decision is made on his behalf by one of his officials, then that 
constitutionally is the Minister’s decision. It is not strictly a matter of 
delegation, it is that of the official acts as the Minister himself and the 
official’s decision is the Minister’s decision.”46 
 
                                                        
41 Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, vol 1 (5th edn, Thomson Canada Ltd 2007) 9-13. 
42 Henry Molot, “The Carltona Doctrine and the Recent Amendments to the Interpretation Act” (1994) 26 
Ottawa L R 2; Michael Taggart, “From “parliamentary powers” to privatization; the checkered history of 
delegated legislation in the twentieth century” (2005) 55 U Toronto LJ  575;  Pierre Cloutier de 
Repentigny, “Precaution, Sub-delegation and Aquaculture Regulation: Morton v Canada (fisheries and 
Oceans)” (2015) 28 J Env L & Prac 125 
43 “Review of Accountabilities and Responsibilities of Ministers” https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/report/rev-
exa/ar-er-eng.pdf  accessed 12 July 2016 
44 “Review of Accountabilities and Responsibilities of Ministers” https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/report/rev-
exa/ar-er-eng.pdf  accessed 12 July 2016 
45 “Review of Accountabilities and Responsibilities of Ministers” https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/report/rev-
exa/ar-er-eng.pdf  accessed 12 July 2016 
46 R. v Skinner [1968] 3 All ER 85 (CA) 
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 The court in Carltona recognized that there is a special relationship 
between a minister and Parliament. Further, the very nature of this relationship 
influenced the court’s understanding of the intent of Parliament with regard to an 
authority granted to a minister through legislation.  
Applying the ‘modern principle’ to the Carltona case 
 
 If we consider the decision in Carltona through the lens of the ‘modern 
principle’ what will it tell us? 
Textual analysis 
 Let us first consider the application of the textual analysis. At first blush the 
plain language of the Act and regulations imply that the “Commissioners of Works” 
were the only “competent authority” who could be delegated the authority to sign 
the document. The Act goes to the trouble of specifically indicating that a 
“competent authority”, in addition to the minister, can sign the document. The 
regulations then establish that the “Commissioners of Works” are such a 
“competent authority”. The application of exclusio unius would lead us to conclude 
that if the “Commissioners of Works” had been named, then no other should be 
considered a “competent authority”.  At the first stage of a ‘modern principle’ 
analysis, we would likely find that no further delegation is allowable. 
The court in Carltona, however, avoided this outcome by choosing to 
distinguish between a delegated authority (which would have resulted in the 
conclusion noted above) and devolution of authority (agency).   Essentially, to avoid 
the reasonable conclusion that Mr Morse was not an “authorized delegate”, they 
simply considered him as an agent. In doing so, the existence of an actual delegate 
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would not necessarily impair them from concluding that Mr Morse exercised the 
authority on behalf of the minister. The court simply avoided the normal textual 
analysis by looking at this as an issue of agency not directly addressed through the 
legislation. In the end, they applied a consequential analysis by reframing the 
authority being exercised by Mr Morse. 
It is interesting to note, as Lord Denning pointed out in a later case, that if 
this were truly an exercise of agency, then the individual signing should indicate 
that they are doing so “on behalf of minister X”.47 In that way it would be clear to the 
person signing and the person receiving the letter, that the authority being 
exercised is that of the minister.  That is, however, not how discretion is exercised 
in most of the Carltona cases.48 
Purposive analysis  
The next stage of the analysis would engage a purposive review of the Act. 
On the one hand it could be argued if the “… delegate was presumed to have been 
chosen to exercise powers or act on another’s behalf because of the confidence 
inspired by the delegate’s personal qualities.”49, which would argue that 
Parliament’s intent was that the named individual would personally exercise the 
discretion.  In the Carltona case that would mean that Parliament’s intent in 
allowing for delegation to a “competent authority” expressed how they wished for 
the minister to exercise his discretion if he could not do so personally.  This also 
supports the textual analysis and would lead to a conclusion that the minister would 
                                                        
47 Metropolitan Borough and Town Clerk of Lewisham v Roberts [1949] 2 K.B. 608, [1949] 1 All ER 815 
(CA) 
48 Henry Molot, “The Carltona Doctrine and the Recent Amendments to tine Interpretation Act” (1994) 26 
Ottawa L Rev 257 
49 John Mark Keyes, “From Delegatus to the Duty to Make Law” (1987) 33 McGill L J 49 
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make the determination himself or, if he found he was unable to do so, would 
delegate so as to ensure that the “competent authority” would act.  
At this stage it is also important to consider the analysis of the relationship 
between the minister and Parliament. Was Parliament’s intent to have the minister 
himself draft the letter or could we consider, as another author has that: 
“… rather than seeing Parliament as indulging in fiction that ministers will 
normally exercise discretions personally, it is preferable to see the drafstmen 
as employing a notation or code whereby the entrusting of a discretion to a 
government department is expressed by conferring that discretion upon the 
minister concerned.”50 
 
In other words, was Parliament’s intent that the minister act himself or that 
he ensure that necessary action is taken by his department to fulfil the mandate of 
the Act? Can we “read in” ministry where it says “minister”?  I would suggest that 
this is exactly what the court has done in the Carltona case by necessarily relying 
on a consequential analysis. 
Consequential analysis 
Carltona was decided principally on the basis of a consequential analysis. 
Fundamentally the courts relied on the determination that it would be 
unreasonable to expect the minister to personally exercise discretion for every 
decision for which he is authorized under the law. The court recognized the 
administrative reality of the departmental organization of government and was 
satisfied that the reporting requirement of the minister would balance the risk in 
allowing someone to act on his behalf. Carltona therefore stands for no more 
than a court applying the three main analytical approached to legislation and, in 
                                                        
50 Mark Freedland, “The rule against delegation and the Carltona doctrine in an agency context” 1996 PL 
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the context of the case, relying primarily on the consequential analysis to come to 
the conclusion that this particular authority was intended to be exercised not by 
the minister personally, but on behalf of the minister by a representative of his 
department. An application of the ‘modern principle’ arrives at the same result. 
The ‘modern principle’ explains delegation 
As we can see from applying the ‘modern principle’ to the both delegatus 
and to the Caltona circumstances, there is truly no need for specialized 
constructs to interpret legislation in the context of delegation. Moreover, it’s been 
suggested about delegation that:  
“… the rule against delegation is in a sense a purposive rule, being 
instrumental in the achievement of a more general notion of institutional 
coherence is, I suggest, evidenced in the way it has been developed and 
applied by the courts.  For it in fact operates not as a blanket prohibition 
upon non-personal exercise of powers or discretions, but rather as requiring 
a more discriminating inquiry as to whether a power of discretion has been 
entrusted to a coherent instructional decision-making structure and 
exercised at the appropriate level within that structure in the way envisaged 
when the power was conferred.”51 
 
I would argue that when considering delegation, the “discriminating 
inquiry” referred to can be accomplished simply through the application of the 
‘modern principle’. Applying the concepts of delegatus and Carltona does not 
further the analysis in any significant manner. In fact, rather than a straight 
forward application of the fundamental principles of interpretation, it confuses the 
reader by suggesting that there are clear rules to apply in all circumstances of 
delegation. It is therefore recommended to avoid this terminology and approach 
any issue of delegation through the application of the ‘modern principle’. 
                                                        
51 Mark Freedland, “The rule against delegation and the Carltona doctrine in an agency context” 1996 PL 
19 
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Further considerations in limiting delegation 
As noted above, there are often arguments that support or detract from 
the presumption of delegation. It can sometimes be difficult to determine which 
arguments should be given more weight. As in all cases of interpretation, court 
decisions will help guide the determination of what weight should be placed on 
each factor or stage of the analysis. The following is a summary of several 
principles expressed by Canadian courts and legislative experts in that context. 
The courts have indicated that when considering issues of delegation, the nature 
of the discretion will have a significant impact on the outcome of the analysis.  
The weight for or against a presumption of intent to delegate will rely heavily on 
what the effects of the discretion will have on individuals. Largely, the greater the 
consequence, the less likely the discretion was intended to be delegated without 
express statutory authorization.52 
The general principle as expressed by Jones and de Villars, and regularly 
reference by Canadian courts,53 is:  
“The general rule is that both delegated legislative and judicial powers 
must be exercised by the very person to whom they have been granted, 
whereas merely administrative powers can be sub-delegated quite freely 
to others.”54(emphasis mine) 
 
Additionally, when: 
 
“… an authority vested with discretionary powers affecting private rights 
empowers one of its committees, members or officers to exercise those 
powers independently without any supervisory control by the authority 
itself, the exercise of the powers is likely to be held invalid.”55 
(emphasis mine) 
                                                        
52 J.H. Grey, “Discretion in Administrative Law”(1979) 17 Osgoode Hall L J 1 
53 Northeast Bottle Ltd v Alberta (Beverage Container Management Board) 2000 ABQB 572 
54 Jones and de Villars, Principles of Administrative Law (5th edn, Carswell 2009) 
55 de Smith, Woolf and Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action  (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1995) 
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 It can reasonably be stated that the more “important” the discretion 
ostensibly being delegated, the less likely it is to be inferred from the statute.56 
The greater the discretion and the consequence of the decision, the less likely 
the court is to allow a sub-delegation without express authority in the statute.57 
Additionally, the more control exercised over the individual using the discretion, 
the more likely the courts will allow it. In fact, if the oversight is particularly 
significant, the courts may not even consider it to be a delegation of authority.58 
The principles expressed by the courts should be considered during both the 
purposive and consequential analysis phase. 
Administrative, judicial and legislative discretion 
The distinction offered by the courts is between administrative, legislative, 
judicial, or “important” discretion. In order to determine which applies, it must be 
understood what he court means by each of these. Otherwise, how can we 
identify which discretion cannot be sub-delegated? 
Administrative 
 
Most cases of administrative powers refer to the issuance of licences, 
permits, or the institution of legal proceedings. Essentially, these are matters that 
require little discretion or are heavily regulated by policy.59 
Often, however, the distinction between administrative, legislative or 
judicial powers is established through a comparison between them, rather than a 
                                                        
56 Mancuso v R, [1980] 1 FC 269; John Mark Keyes, “From Delegatus to the Duty to Make Law” (1987) 33 
McGill L J 49 
57 J.H. Grey, “Discretion in Administrative Law”(1979) 17 Osgoode Hall L J 1 
58 Northeast Bottle Depot Ltd v Alberta (Beverage Container Management Board), 2000 ABQB 572 
59 David J Mullan,  Administrative Law  (Irwin 2001) 
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direct definition. The Supreme Court of Canada, in British Columbia 
Development Corp v British Columbia (Ombudsman) [1984] 2 SCR 447 used the 
following reasoning to identify what is legislative versus administrative in nature: 
“A legislative act is the creation and promulgation of a general rule of 
conduct without reference to particular cases; an administrative act cannot 
exactly be defined, but it includes the adoption of a policy, the making and 
issue of a specific direction, and the application of a general rule to a 
particular case in accordance with the requirements or policy of 
expediency or administrative practice.”60 
 
 In determining if the discretion is administrative, it will require a close 
examination of the actual discretion exercised, the level of control over the 
“decision maker” and the nature of the matter, whether routine or likely to effect a 
significant consequence. 
Judicial 
Interestingly, matters that touch on administrative law are not necessarily 
“administrative”. They may be considered judicial or quasi-judicial. An 
administrative tribunal can be considered quasi-judicial if the decisions it makes 
require the exercise of discretion and have significant consequences on the 
individuals being heard.61  When trying to determine if the discretion is judicial: 
“… the answer to the question whether a body is acting in a judicial 
capacity when performing a particular function does not necessarily 
depend upon the degree in which the body’s general characteristics 
resemble those of an ordinary court, although the degree of resemblance 
may be a major factor influencing a decision that the function in question 
is judicial.”62 
 
                                                        
60 de Smith, Woolf and Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action  (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1995) 
1000 
61 David Lanham, “Delegation and the Alter Ego Principle” (1984) 100 LQR 587 
62 de Smith, Woolf and Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action  (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1995)  
1012 
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 Therefore one should look more closely at the procedures being followed 
to determine if the nature is judicial: 
“They determine matters in cases initiated by parties; they must normally 
sit in public; they are empowered to compel the attendance of witnesses, 
who may be examined on oath; they are required to follow the rules of 
evidence; they are entitled to impose sanctions by way of imprisonment, 
fine damages or mandatory or prohibitory orders, and to enforce 
obedience to their own commands.”63 
 
It is important to consider as well, that if the body is advisory or does not exercise 
discretion themselves but just applies the already established criteria, it will not 
be considered to be an exercise of discretion.64 : 
“… a body exercising powers which are merely advisory, deliberative, 
investigatory or conciliatory character, or which do not have legal effect 
until confirmed by another body, or involve only the making of a 
preliminary decision will not normally be held to be acting in a judicial 
capacity.”65  
 
Moreover, if the matter involves a determination of an essential aspect of a 
benefit, where discretion must be exercised, it will likely be considered judicial or 
quasi-judicial.66 One again, an in depth analysis of the nature of the discretion 
being exercised will provide guidance on whether the matter is judicial.  
                                                        
63 de Smith, Woolf and Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action  (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1995) 
64 Forget v Quebec (Attorney general), [1988] 2 SCR 90. The court allowed that a committee established to 
develop and evaluate a standardized language test for nurses did not exercise discretion; they simply 
complied with the criteria established by the governing body. As a result the court found that there had 
been no sub delegation of authority. 
65 de Smith, Woolf and Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action  (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1995) 
66 Mancuso v R [1980] 1 FC 269. This was a pension case where a crucial finding as to who would receive the 
survivor benefit required a determination as to whether a widow could be entitled to maintenance. Because the 
consequence was significant and it was not simply a direct application of rules or guidelines, the determination 
needed to be made by the minister. 
 31 
 
Legislative 
 
 The authority to create legislation, regulations, by-laws or in some 
circumstances develop policy is considered as “legislative”.67 These powers are 
not delegable except expressly in the legislation. No intent to delegate is inferred 
or implied by the court as the matters are too important and Parliament is 
deemed to have intended the named individual to exercise the discretion. Of 
course, that is not to suggest that the named individual is actually drafting the 
legislation. They will, however, control the process and approve the final product. 
It is in this manner that they exert their control over the discretion. 
 As part of the analytical process in applying the ‘modern principle’ it will be 
necessary to determine whether the discretion is judicial, legislative or 
administrative in nature in order to determine whether Parliament intended for the 
power or discretion to be further delegated. 
Case study: Powers of an ‘Acting’ Commanding Officer 
 
 The analysis conducted so far suggests that delegatus and Carltona can 
be viewed as alternative expressions of the ‘modern principle’, and that applying 
the ‘modern principle’ alone should be sufficient to resolve any issue of 
delegation. There is no value in adopting the delegatus and Carltona concepts 
when interpreting allowable delegation. 
To demonstrate how the ‘modern principle’ is sufficient to explain whether 
delegation is allowable in a given circumstance. I will provide a practical 
example. I will consider whether a Commanding Officer’s (CO’s) authority can be 
                                                        
67 Québec (Attorney General) v Carrières Ste-Thérèse Ltée [1982] 69 CCC (2d) 251; David J Mullan,  
Administrative Law  (Irwin 2001) 370; John Mark Keyes, Executive Legislation (2nd edn, LexisNexis2010) 
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 32 
 
delegated to an ‘acting’ Commanding Officer in the Canadian Armed Forces 
(CAF). In order to narrow the scope of the inquiry, I will look at whether the 
‘acting’ CO can exercise the CO’s authority to preside at a summary trial in two 
cases: 1. Where the CO is established through an organizational order; and 2. 
Where the CO is established through a designation.  
Context 
In Canada, our military forces are subject to civilian oversight. The 
government (elected civilian representatives) has full control of the military 
through the exercise of Ministerial authority and the application of relevant 
legislation and regulation.68  The CAF is intended to achieve the policy intent as 
established by the civilian authority.  
The principle legislation that guides CAF members on military matters is 
the National Defence Act (NDA). The Act authorizes the creation of regulations 
by the Minister of National Defence (MND), the Governor in Council (GIC) and 
the Treasury Board (TB).69 Those regulations, and the orders issued by the Chief 
of Defence Staff (CDS), are found in the Queen’s Regulations and Orders 
(QR&O).70 Further direction is provided to members of the military through the 
orders provided in the Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD).71 
Additional local orders and policy direction also exists. It is this body of law that 
                                                        
68 The Emergencies Act, the Emergency Preparedness Act, the Visiting Forces Act and the Financial 
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the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence” (2nd edn, September 1999) 
http://www.queensu.ca/dms/DMS_Course_Materials_and_Outline/Readings-MPA834/NDHQ-
Accountability%20and%20Organization-Sept1999.pdf accessed 5 June 2016 
69 National Defence Act RSC 1985 c N-5 s 4, 5, 6 
70 Queen’s Regulations and Orders http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-queens-
regulations-orders/index.page accessed 14 Aug 2016 
71 Defence Administrative Orders and Directives http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-
defence-admin-orders-directives/index.page accessed 16 Aug 2016 
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will guide the following analysis, as well as the application of the ‘modern 
principle’. 
What authority does a CO exercise? 
When we consider the delegation of the CO’s authority, to what are we 
referring? What authority does the Commanding Officer exercise? In the modern 
Canadian military, commanding officers, whether they are directing flying 
squadrons, training schools, Her Majesty’s Canadian Ships, infantry battalions or 
support staff, have multifarious responsibilities with respect to their subordinates 
and their superiors. These can, however, be divided into four main categories:  
1. Command This consists of the day to day requirement to run the unit 
and direct the activities of their subordinates in order to accomplish the mission. 
This could include anything from authorizing group or individual training to 
commanding deployed troops on operation. 
2. Financial Commanding officers are responsible for their unit’s budget 
and the proper allocation of resources to fulfill their mandate. This can range 
from buying office supplies to authorizing travel expenses to paying the salary of 
reservists working in the unit. 
3. Administrative These refer to administrative decisions such as acting 
as the initial authority in grievance matters or recommending the release of a 
member. 
4. Disciplinary Commanding Officers are expected to address 
performance and behavior concerns through the issuance of remedial measures 
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for poor performance as well as by presiding over summary trials as part of the 
Military Justice system. 
What is a CO? 
 
 The CAF is a hierarchical entity with strict reporting requirements. Its 
members are divided up, normally, into units, formations, elements and 
commands.72 At the head of each of these is an officer entrusted with command 
over the group of individuals, these are referred to as Commanding Officers. For 
the sake of our analysis we will confine ourselves primarily to the consideration of 
the unit which has been defined as “an individual body of the Canadian Forces 
that is organized as such pursuant to section 17 of the National Defence Act, with 
the personnel and material thereof.”73 We will also consider groups of individuals 
who do not fit this definition very well but who still have a Commanding Officer. 
These groups of individuals occur where a unit or formation has not been 
established but where there is a collection of individuals who require direction.74 
                                                        
72 National Defence Act RSC 1985 c N-5  s 17 (1) 
73 Queen’s Regulations and Orders s 1.02 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-queens-
regulations-orders-vol-01/ch-01.page#cha-001-02 accessed 10 Jun 2016 
74 An example of such an entity is the office of the Judge Advocate General. The JAG is the head of all the 
lawyers working for the CAF. The JAG’s role and responsibilities are defined in the National Defence Act 
and the QR&Os. The role and responsibilities of the legal officers are defined in QR&Os.  However, there 
is no established formation or unit in the Office of the JAG, despite the fact that there are well over 200 
full-time and 100 part-time lawyers in uniform. The lawyers are spread across Canada and posted to 
positions that are established by the Vice chief of Defence Staff. The JAG has established a structure for 
organizing his staff and these are divided into Divisions based on the nature of the law being practiced. The 
normal requirement to respond to a superior officer applies to all the legal officers, therefore day to day 
activities and responsiveness is not an issue despite the lack of a formal unit or formation. However certain 
actions can only be taken by COs (such as granting leave, issuing remedial measure, presiding over 
summary trials, adjudicating grievances etc) therefore there is a need for a CO. To address this, the CDS 
has named certain senior officers as individuals who can designate COs.  The JAG has designated COs 
based on our internal reporting structure which allows for the management of personnel. These COs, and 
others established in the same manner, are “designated COs” who received their authority indirectly. 
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A unit is created when the Minister authorizes the establishment of a unit 
through a Ministerial Organization Order (MOO)75 and the CDS then orders the 
creation of the unit through a Canadian Forces Organizational Order (CFOO).76 
The CFOO directs that the officer appointed to command the unit is a 
Commanding Officer.  
While most groups of military members in the CAF are part of a unit, 
formation or command; some are not formally organized in this manner. In 
essence, they are a group of individuals who have a common purpose and who 
have an officer commanding them. They are organized and have an internal 
chain of command and are a named entity, but they are not a unit. Because they 
are not created through a MOO and CFOO, the officer in charge is not 
automatically a Commanding Officer. There is, however significant value in 
ensuring that they have a Commanding Officer who has the authority to exercise 
command, financial, administrative and  disciplinary jurisdiction over them. In 
order to address this concern the CDS will designated that the person who 
occupies the position is a Commanding Officer. Hence we have two types of 
Commanding Officers: the CFOO CO who is established under an order as a 
                                                        
75Section 17 of the National Defence Act states: “(1) The Canadian Forces shall consist of such units and 
other elements as are from time to time organized by or under the authority of the Minister. (2) A unit or 
other element organized under subsection (1) shall from time to time be embodied in such component of 
the Canadian Forces as may be directed by or under the authority of the Minister.” QR&O 2.08 provides 
that: “(1) the minister may authorize:  (a) the establishment of commands and formations; and (b) the 
allocation to commands and formations of such bases, units and elements that the Minister considers 
expedient.” http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-queens-regulations-orders-vol-01/ch-
02.page#cha-002-08 accessed on 12 July 2016. 
76 Canadian Forces “Interim Organization and Establishment Policy”  
http://vcds.mil.ca/sites/CProg/Resources/DDFP%20files/Updated%20CFP%20219%202012.pdf accessed 5 
July 2016 
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CO; and the designated CO who is, arguably, delegated the authority to be a CO 
by the CDS.77 
What is an ‘acting’ CO? 
During the absence of the Commanding Officer (CO), whether for 
operations or personal reasons, in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the 
unit and the maintenance of discipline, COs will routinely name an individual to 
act on their behalf. This person is the ‘acting’ CO. The question has arisen as to 
whether the assignment of an ‘acting’ works to delegate all of the powers of the 
CO.  In the present case I will explore whether the authority to act as a presiding 
officer at a summary trial can be delegated to an ‘acting’ CO and consider 
whether this answer would change depending on how the CO was established.  
Can an acting CO preside over a summary trial? 
 
Explicit summary trial jurisdiction 
Before we can engage the ‘modern principle’ we need to establish the 
relevant law that will apply to the analysis. Section 163(1) of the NDA provides 
that a “commanding officer” may try an accused person at summary trial.78 
Section 160 of the NDA defines a commanding officer as: 
                                                        
77 Gallagher v R  Standing Court Martial 1999. The court argues that designated COs are COs through 
delegation and therefore cannot further delegate. 
78 National Defence Act RSC 1985 c N-5  s 163 states: 163. (1) A commanding officer may try an accused 
person by summary trial if all of the following conditions are satisfied: 
1. the accused person is either an officer cadet or a non-commissioned member below the 
rank of warrant officer; 
2. having regard to the gravity of the offence, the commanding officer considers that his or 
her powers of punishment are adequate; 
3. if the accused person has the right to elect to be tried by court martial, the accused person 
has not elected to be so tried; 
4. the offence is not one that, according to regulations made by the Governor in Council, the 
commanding officer is precluded from trying; and 
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“In this Division, commanding officer, in respect of an accused person, 
means the commanding officer of the accused person and includes an 
officer who is empowered by regulations made by the Governor in 
Council to act as the commanding officer of the accused 
person.”(emphasis added) 
 
QR&O 1.02 defines a “commanding officer” as 
“a. except when the Chief of Defence Staff otherwise directs, an officer in 
command of a base, unit or element, or 
b. any other officer designated as a commanding officer by or under 
the authority of the chief of Defence Staff.” 
 
QR&O 101.01 states: 
(1) For the purposes of proceedings under the Code of Service Discipline, 
“commanding officer”: 
a. means, in addition to the officers mentioned in the definition of 
commanding officer in articles 1.02 (Definitions), a detachment 
commander; … 
 
On a strict reading of the legislation and regulations in order to exercise summary 
trial jurisdiction, a person must be a CO.  A CO includes: 
 
 1. an officer in command of a unit; 
 2. an officer designated as a commanding officer; and 
 3. a detachment commander. 
 
Explicit authority to delegate 
 
 In the summary trial context the CO has jurisdiction over certain ranks and 
offences.79 The commanding officer, however, can delegate certain matters to a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
5. the commanding officer does not have reasonable grounds to believe that the accused 
person is unfit to stand trial or was suffering from a mental disorder at the time of the 
commission of the alleged offence. 
(1.1) A commanding officer may not try an accused person by summary trial unless the summary trial 
commences within one year after the day on which the service offence is alleged to have been committed. 
79 QR&O 108.07 provides for the offences, established under the National Defence Act, over which a 
commanding officer has jurisdiction. Certain matters can only be tried at court martial, generally matters 
that engage more serious penalties or that engage complex legal concepts not appropriate for a 
commanding officer to determine. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-queens-regulations-
orders-vol-02/ch-108.page accesed 12 Jul 2016. 
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delegated officer.80 The jurisdiction and powers of punishment of a delegated 
officer are limited. However, that delegation is only with respect to summary trial 
jurisdiction.  
Delegation of command 
 
The above delegation applies exclusively to summary trial jurisdiction. 
However, the military has long had a means of transferring command in the 
absence (temporary or otherwise) of a commander.81 A general power of 
“delegation” contained in section 49 of the National Defence Act, states: 
“Any power or jurisdiction given to, and any act or thing to be done by, 
to or before any officer or non-commissioned member may be exercised 
by, or done by, to or before any other officer or non-commissioned 
member for the time being authorized in that behalf by regulation or 
according to the custom of the service.” 
 
 The relevant regulations are found in Chapter 3 of the QR&Os which 
address issues of command succession. The general rule is that the most senior 
officer present assumes command.82 However, in the case of an officer in 
command of a unit, there is an option for the officer in command to direct 
otherwise.83 There is no clear indication as to what is meant by “otherwise direct” 
                                                        
80 Section 163(4) of the National Defence Act states: “A Commanding officer may, subject to regulations 
made by the Governor in Council and to the extent that the commanding officer deems fit, delegate powers 
to try an accused person by summary trial to any officer under the commanding officer’s command…”. 
QR&O 108.10 provides for further restrictions as to whom the CO can delegate his powers to. 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-queens-regulations-orders-vol-02/ch-108.page 
accessed 10 Jun 2016 
81 In a construct such as the military, where combat can remove, permanently, the commanding mind of the 
force, there needs to be an established means of transferring authority “on the fly” to ensure that there is 
always a clear command authority. Nowhere is this more important than in the field of battle. There has, 
therefore, been established a standardized means of transferring command automatically. QR&O chapter 3 
explores how command is transferred. The usual rule, with exceptions for ships and aircraft, is that the next 
most senior officer assumes command.  
82 QR&O 3.20 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-queens-regulations-orders-vol-01/ch-
03.page#cha-003-20  
83 QR&O 3.23 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-queens-regulations-orders-vol-01/ch-
03.page#cha-003-20  
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but a plain reading would suggest that this means the CO can indicate whom 
they wish to take command in their absence (appoint as their acting). 
 The regulations provide for a CO of a unit to transfer command directly to 
another officer. There is also provision for the automatic transfer of command to 
the most senior officer present when there is no direction by the CO of the unit. In 
the case of a designated CO, there appears to only be specific regulation that 
allow for the ability to transfer command to the senior officer present. Any other 
authority would have to be inferred. 
Applying the ‘modern principle’ to the case 
Textual analysis 
 The Act and regulations allow for a commanding officer or a delegated 
officer to have summary trial jurisdiction.  There is a specific scheme established to 
allow for the CO to delegate some authority over matters dealt with at summary 
trial.  A CO for the purpose of delegation will include: 
 1. an officer in command of a unit; 
 2. a designated commanding officer; and 
 3. a detachment commander. 
 There is a clear authority to delegate.  Given that this is the case, expressio 
unius can be applied to argue that no other delegation can take place. The clear 
expression of an authority to delegate implies that no further delegation was 
intended; otherwise the law would have been expressly drafted to do so. 
 However, there is also an alternative means of viewing this. Is the acting 
officer “in command” and therefore a CO for summary trial purposes? 
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 If we consider the case of the unit CO, we note that section 49 of the NDA 
allows for all the powers of the individual to be exercised by another officer in 
accordance with regulations.  The unit CO has the authority to transfer command, 
other than by seniority, if that officer “otherwise directs”.  If the CO indicates that 
they have selected an officer to take over command in their absence that officer 
would be “in command” of the unit during the absence of the CO. The definition of 
CO for summary trial purposes is “the officer in command of the unit” therefore the 
‘acting’ CO fulfils the definition and has summary trial jurisdiction. 
 In the case of a designated CO, while the powers of the CO can be 
transferred in accordance with section 49, command can only be transferred to the 
next most senior officer.  Therefore the designated CO cannot truly appoint an 
‘acting’ CO as there is no exercise of discretion. Command authority automatically 
flows to the next most senior officer.  
The officer exercising the command authority is not a designated CO simply 
by virtue of exercising command.84 Therefore there is no automatic authority to 
exercise summary trial jurisdiction.  If the drafters had wished to ensure that an 
‘acting’ CO could exercise jurisdiction, they could have drafted the section similarly 
to that of command.  CO could have been defined as “the officer in command of a 
unit, the designated commanding officer, the detachment commander or an officer 
                                                        
84 While it could be argued that taking command from the designated CO would establish the new officer as 
a designated CO, in practice this would be unlikely. Some designation letters identify the officers by name, 
which would prohibit the presumption of the new officer being designated. In other cases the designation is 
to the person in command of XYZ or posted to the position of XYZ with a minimum rank. In most cases 
only the CO has the requisite rank and only the CO is posted to the position in question. However, it could 
be argued, if the designation is made to a named command and no restrictions on rank are established, the 
officer assuming command by virtue of QR&O could be the designated CO and therefore exercise 
summary trial jurisdiction. 
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appointed by that person to act on their behalf.” However, it wasn’t and we must 
assume that there was a reason that this was not done. 
On the basis of a textual analysis, the unit CO can appoint someone to take 
command of the unit and exercise summary trial jurisdiction.  The designated CO 
can have the most senior officer present take command in their absence but they 
are not a CO for summary trial purposes. 
Purposive analysis 
 What was the intent of the legislature when it passed the law and issued the 
regulations?  An express delegation of authority to a defined entity was created. 
This suggests that the individual was selected based on their personal 
characteristics.  
 The CO was provided with the ability to delegate the less serious matters to 
a delegated officer. This implies that more serious matters should be kept with the 
CO and not passed along to another. Inferring an alternate delegation scheme, 
would likely be at odds with the intent. 
 Additionally, the scheme allows for an alternative CO if the unit CO is 
unavailable. The Base Commander can act as the CO in that circumstance.85 This 
also suggests that the legislature intended for summary trials to be conducted by 
the CO and not a delegate. 
 However, the scheme also allows for us to consider that if an officer 
assumes command by virtue of regulations, they are the CO and not a delegate. 
This is also clearly the intent of Parliament as expressed in section 49 of the Act. 
                                                        
85 QR&O 101.01 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-queens-regulations-orders-vol-02/ch-
101.page#cha-101-01   
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While there was likely no intent to allow a general authority to delegate, there was 
an intent to ensure that command continued uninterrupted.  
 The purposive analysis supports the textual analysis and the idea that the 
officer assuming command of a unit can exercise summary trial jurisdiction but the 
officer assuming command in replacement of a designated officer would likely not. 
Consequential analysis 
 
 The consequence of allowing the ‘acting’ to take command is to allow the 
continuous functioning of the unit in managing disciplinary issues. In a wartime 
scenario where command replacements could be taking place due to casualties, 
it would be important to ensure that command transfer was efficient and that the 
ability to maintain discipline is retained. It could be effectively argued that for both 
designated COs and unit COs it would be essential to maintain continuity.  
 If we adopt the interpretation that the officer taking over command from 
the designated CO can exercise all the other command authorities, it seems 
unusual that only discipline would be excluded. While alternative means of 
addressing discipline matters exist, suggesting that the ability to command troops 
and send them into danger will be transferred but the ability to deal with 
disciplinary matters will not, appears nonsensical. Underlying this, however, is 
the principle that judicial powers are very important and should not be delegated 
without express authority.86   
                                                        
86In R v Gallagher, a charge was referred to court martial by the ‘acting’ CO of a designated CO. The court 
determined, on the basis of a rudimentary application of the delegatus principle, that there existed no 
authority to delegate summary trial jurisdiction from a designated CO to and ‘acting’.  The analysis 
suggested that since the authority to act as a CO was already delegated by the CDS (as the CO was 
designated) the authority could not be further delegated. There was not consideration of the analysis 
proposed above or a strict consideration of how the transfer of command might have allowed the next most 
senior officer to take over the designation.  Fundamentally the analysis appears to be a flawed and supports 
 43 
 
Determination of the ‘modern principle’ 
 
 Applying the ‘modern principle’ to determine if an ‘acting’ CO, be it of a 
unit or on behalf of a designated CO, can exercise summary trial jurisdiction has 
revealed that it is allowable in the case of a unit CO and likely not allowable in 
the case of a designated CO. While on the surface, the issue initially appeared to 
be one of sub-delegation, a closer analysis reveals that, it is primarily a strict 
application of the Act and regulation that allows us to determine that the unit CO 
can appoint an acting. The designated CO cannot appoint an acting but the most 
senior officer can take command during the absence of the CO. It is unlikely, due 
to the nature of the designation instrument, that the officer taking over command 
can exercise summary trial jurisdiction.  
Conclusions 
 Delegatus and Carltona provide us with no appreciable benefit when 
conducting an analysis as to whether delegation or devolution is allowable in 
certain circumstances.  There are so many exceptions to when and how they apply 
that as independent constructs they no longer hold much value. While the concepts 
have proved helpful in guiding the law to where it is today, they no longer assist in 
the process of interpreting law. The principles they express are fully incorporated in 
the ‘modern principle’ and no longer necessary. 
 These concepts also provide little assistance to drafters as they try to ensure 
that the message from the legislature is clearly expressed. Rather than considering 
whether delegatus or Carltona could apply, drafters should focus on providing a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the argument that it would be better to apply the modern principle that to try to engage delegatus. R. v 
Gallagher, 1999 Standing Court Martial (transcript available upon request)  
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clear statement as to who may exercise the authority and to whom and in what 
circumstances it may be delegated. While drafting, they should always bear in mind 
that the ‘modern principle’ will apply and provide guidance in the text as to the intent 
of the legislature. 
Despite the best efforts of the drafters, there may remain ambiguous 
sections of the legislation. When interpreting these uncertainties, it is best to 
approach any delegation questions by applying the ‘modern principle’ 
systematically. In the example above, we can see that when applied to a question 
of delegation within the Canadian Armed Forces, this tool is sufficient to respond to 
any question of delegation or perceived delegation. The ‘modern principle’ is the 
best tool for the job. 
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